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Kidnapped Terrorists:
Bringing International Criminals to Justice through
Irregular Rendition and Other Quasi-legal Options
I. Introduction
Through the use of its extradition treaties with other states, the United States has
successfully returned a number of terrorists from other countries to stand trial in the
United States for acts and planned acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens. Since the mid-
1980s, several high-profile international terrorists and narco-terrorists have been re-
turned to the United States from foreign countries through the use of a process known as
irregular rendition. Irregular rendition is the forceful abduction of an individual from
one country by agents of another country, principally without the knowledge or consent
of the former. Irregular rendition occurs outside the parameters of extradition treaties.
Irregular rendition may be an effective way of bringing terrorists to justice. However,
irregular rendition may affect a state's relationship with the nation who refused to extra-
dite their national, as well as the state's reputation among the international community.
Should irregular rendition still be a viable option in the 21st century? Other options are
available to a requesting state when a requested state refuses to extradite and does not
adequately punish or prosecute the terrorist.
In this Note, the theories behind extradition, the rule of "prosecute or extradite," and
the idea of using due diligence when prosecuting and punishing a criminal offender, will
be thoroughly explored, relying on both customary international law and treaty-based
law. In Part II, this Note will focus specifically on the historical reasons for a policy of
non-extradition of nationals, common among many states. Part III will examine why this
policy of non-extradition causes other states to use force extraterritorially (i.e., irregular
rendition). Many international scholars as well as other nation-states disagree with the
idea of using force extraterritorially for reasons other than self-defense during an "armed
attack," as defined in article 51 of the U.N. Charter. In Part III, this Note will study ir-
regular rendition further and see whether, in some extreme circumstances, irregular ren-
dition may be justified.
Lastly, in Part IV, this Note will show that irregular rendition should no longer be
the only choice when negotiations regarding extradition fail. Luring fugitives into inter-
national waters or cooperating with another state outside the formal process of extradi-
tion are options that may prove less offensive and intrusive, and more effective than
forcibly abducting the criminal from a nation that does not consent to the abduction.
Other viable options include increased cooperation among states, revised, stricter extra-
dition treaties, U.N. involvement when a state refuses to either extradite or punish, and
an enhanced mutual respect for a nation's sovereignty. These proposals can achieve the
same outcome as irregular rendition: protect nationals abroad and bring criminal offend-
ers to justice. Moreover, this movement toward bilateral cooperation establishes friendly
ties and shows respect for other nations' sovereignty. Extensive international coopera-
tion concerning extraterritorial investigations will make the world a smaller place, and
terrorists and narco-terrorist havens will become more difficult to find. Though irregular
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rendition may have short-term advantages, irregular rendition can hamper friendly rela-
tions among states and halt their cooperative efforts in the long run. This Note uses ex-
amples in Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic to illustrate this point.
H. Extradition and The Rule of Due Diligence
Extradition is a formal process through which a state diplomatically surrenders
criminal suspects to foreign governments requesting transfer of such suspects.1 Extradi-
tion developed as a formal process to recover fugitives as sovereign entities grew to
respect the territorial integrity of other nations.2 Extradition is based upon fundamental
principles of international law.3 Reciprocity and comity have long been established as
international principles of friendly cooperation among states.4 Comity can be defined as
an act of courtesy, goodwill cooperation between states, and a mutual recognition
among the states concerning each other's own legislative, executive and judicial acts
with regard to each particular extradition request.5 Under the principle of reciprocity, a
government of a state grants an extradition request only in exchange for the extradition
or promise of future extradition of an individual that such government seeks from its
counterpart.6 If this reciprocity is so consistent that it becomes a custom of that state, it
may become binding under international law.7 Respect for territorial sovereignty is also
an important principle of international law, thus the need for a formal process to extra-
dite so that a state will not feel it is being intruded upon if another state chooses to enter
and remove a person from within its own borders.8
The Hague (1971), Montreal (1971), and Hostages Conventions (1979) reveal the
international theory of imposing on contracting states the duty to prosecute or extradite
criminal offenders. 9 These Conventions require the state to take suspects into custody to
enable criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted against them.10 The European
Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, signed in 1977, also affirmed the obligation of
the states of the Council of Europe to prosecute or extradite terrorists.1
Another fundamental principle regarding extradition, other than the concept of
prosecute- or-eigtradite, is the treaty system. The treaty system anchors modem extradi-
tion practices.' 2 Most current extradition treaties are bilateral since specific criminal
needs necessitate the creation of individually-tailored treaties between specified pairs of
states.' 3 Usually, states cooperate in establishing specific procedures for extradition
1. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 2-3 (3d
ed. 1996).
2. See Kai I. Rebane, Note, Extradition & Individual Rights: The Need for an International Criminal
Court to Safeguard Individual Rights, 19 FORDHAM INT'L J. 1636, 1644-46 (1996).
3. See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1454 (1988).





9. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 1646 art. 7 (1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Act
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 571 art. 7 [hereinafter
Montreal Convention]; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M.
1456,1460 art. 8 [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
10. See Jimmy Gurul, Terrorism, Territorial Sovereignty, and the Forcible Apprehension of International
Criminals Abroad, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457, 474 (1994).
11. See European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, 15 I.L.M.
1272-76 (1976) [hereinafter Terrorism Convention].
12. See Rebane, supra note 2, at 1647.
13. See id. at 1648.
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under a treaty agreement. 14 "Common extradition treaty features include a dual crimi-
nality provision or a list of specific criminal conduct warranting extradition, a clause
addressing the extradition of nationals, a list of protected rights, and a political offense
exception." ' 5 The treaty system, comity, and reciprocity all dictate their international
extradition procedures.' 6 It is also important to remember that each nation's domestic
extradition process is governed by its own internal laws and policies.
17
When choosing to prosecute criminal suspects rather than extradite, customary in-
ternational law has imposed a duty on all states to use due diligence in prosecuting and
punishing criminal offenders within the state's territorial boundaries.1 8 This idea of using
due diligence in prosecuting and punishing the criminal offender has been codified in
various multilateral conventions and treaties. The Hague and Montreal Conventions
state that the contracting nations have a duty to provide "the greatest measure of assis-
tance in connection with the criminal proceedings."' 9 The Janes20 case best represents
the idea of state responsibility to use due diligence. In Janes, a U.S. citizen was mur-
dered in Mexico, and although the Mexican authorities had eyewitnesses to the murder,
they did nothing to apprehend the suspect. 2' The United States alleged that Mexico was
derelict in its duty under international law to use due diligence.22 The General Claims
Commission found that the Mexican government was liable for "not having measured up
to its duty of diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender. "23 States must
keep this in mind when deciding to prosecute rather than extradite.
MI. The Policy of Non-Extradition of Nationals Has Led to Irregular Rendition
Many states opt to prosecute offenders within their own borders, especially if the
criminal suspect is a national of that state. This modem practice of non-extradition of
nationals dates back to medieval times, and is rooted in the relationship between the
feudal ruler and his subjects.24 While the ruler owed protection to his subjects for their
allegiance, work, and contribution to his wealth and power, the subjects were entitled to
the ius de non evocando, the right not to be withdrawn from the jurisdiction of their
local courts.25 In 1777, France and the Helvetic League agreed that each party would not
deliver up its own citizens except for a grave et public.26 Most European countries
adopted this rule by the middle of the nineteenth century; the rule has persisted in
Europe and Latin America. 27 With the exception of the Netherlands and a specific situa-
tion among the Nordic countries, no countries mentioned above have abandoned this
doctrine.28 In contrast, according to several opinions made by U.S. courts, "United
14. See Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 49.
15. Joshua H. Warmund, Removing Drug Lords and Street Pushers: The Extradition of Nationals in
Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22 FORDHAM INT' L L.J. 2373, 2381 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
16. See id.
17. See Rebane, supra note 2, 1649.
18. See Guruld, supra note 10, at 473.
19. Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 6, 22 U.S.T. 1645-46; Montreal Convention, supra note 9, art. 6,
24 U.S.T. at 570.
20. Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 82 (1925).
21. See id. at 87.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. See Michael Plachta, (Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
77, 82 (1999).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 83.




States citizenship does not bar extradition by the United States.', 29 American citizenship
of an offender grants "neither an immunity for offenses committed abroad, nor a right to
demand all the procedural guarantees existing under the law of the United States. "
30
A. Non-Extradition and Territorial Sovereignty
Why have so many states maintained this rule of non-extradition of nationals? The
rule of non-extradition largely rests on the notion of territorial sovereignty. This notion,
according to Harvard Research in Intemational Law, "presupposes the existence of sharp
contrasts in the administration of criminal justice between states, resulting in potentially
unfair treatment. 31 If this was the case and unfair treatment was commonplace when
extradition of nationals occurred, then Harvard Research correctly points out that "[i]f
justice as administered in other States is not to be trusted, then there should be no extra-
dition at all."32 Moreover, many feel the reason for a state's refusal to surrender its na-
tionals is a special relationship between them and their home country. This theory, de-
veloped by German writers, has remained unclear, and has recently been criticized for
being "devoid of any practical significance. ,33 Along the lines of territorial sovereignty,
other arguments in support of the non-extradition of nationals include: the fundamental
right to asylum, popular instinct of society, disparity in the domestic legal systems with
respect to substantive law and procedure, and the potential for bias and prejudice against
the offender, based solely on his foreign origin and nationality.
34
B. Non-Extradition Policy and Fear, Bribery, and Governmental Corruption
Fear of retaliation, bribery, and overall government corruption are also reasons why
many states choose to prosecute rather extradite. France is an example of refusing to
extradite for fear of retaliation. In 1977, France refused Israel and West Germany's re-
quest for the extradition of Muhammad Daoud Audeh, the mastermind behind the 1972
Munich Olympics massacre in which eleven Israeli athletes were seized and murdered
by Palestinian terrorists. 35 The French did not wish to incur the wrath of the PLO. In
1985, Italy refused to hand PLO hijackers over to the United States and actually ar-
ranged for their leader, Mohammed Abu Abbas, to escape to Yugoslavia, in order to
avoid possible terrorist retaliation.36 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Europe, fearful of
potential reprisals, seemed more inclined to provide a safe haven for international ter-
rorists than to seek their apprehension.
Caribbean and South American nations' refusal to comply with extradition treaties
rests more with the reasons of bribery and general government corruption. These nations
that prohibit extradition, particularly of their nationals, hamper the U.S. law enforce-
ment efforts to combat its own domestic drug problem. Narco-terrorism has arisen as a
force to be contended with, particularly in South America, and is defined as "drug traf-
ficking by insurgent/terrorist groups, the commission of violent acts by these groups to
possibly influence government policy, and any type of linkages between terrorist groups
and narcotics organizations., 37 For example, in the mid-1980s in Colombia, several
29. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 782 (9th Cir. 1986).
30. Plachta, supra note 24, at 87.
31. Id. at 88.
32. Id. (quoting Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L
L. 15, 296 (Supp. 1935)).
33. Id. at 90.
34. See id.
35. See Bruce Hoffman, Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?, FOREIGN POL'Y, July 1, 1999 at 62.
36. See id.
37. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1989).
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insurgent/terrorist groups operating within Colombia emerged in an attempt to topple its
government. One of these groups included the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colom-
bia (FARC) and the April 19th Movement (M19), which began to participate in the lu-
crative drug trade. 38 The FARC and the M19 were connected among and between vari-
ous insurgent/terrorist groups and established drug-trafficking families. The November
6-7, 1985, takeover of Colombia's Palace of Justice, where judicial proceedings and
drug-related extraditions were in progress, reveals just one example of apparent early
cooperation between Colombian terrorist groups and drug lords.39 During the takeover,
Colombia's highest court was seized by M19 gunmen. This siege concluded with nu-
merous killings of magistrates who were involved in drug-related proceedings.4n Many
have speculated that the key motive for this onslaught was to stop extraditions and in-
timidate judicial officers from acting against drug traffickers.
Drug traffickers fear extradition because it virtually assures them a U.S. prison sen-
tence. The Colombian Treaty of 1979 provided for the extradition of wanted individuals
who are charged with or convicted of offenses listed in a schedule annexed to the treaty,
including drug-related offenses. 41 Supporters who voiced their beliefs soon became vic-
tims of narco-terrorism.42 In 1986, the Colombian Supreme Court nullified the law that
enabled the Colombian Treaty.43 Most commentators agree that this decision, and those
similar to it, were the result of fear, intimidation, and coercion stemming from the
narco-terrorist response to the Colombian treaty.44
The Dominican Republic provides another example of a non-extradition policy due
to a reign of violence and corruption to ensure that anti-drug efforts to create a favorable
pro-extradition policy fail. Article VIII of the Dominican Treaty with the United States,
adopted in 1910, provided for the extradition of nationals subject to executive discre-
tion.45 In 1969, the Dominican legislature nullified the discretionary authority granted to
the executive by passing Law 489 of the Domestic Penal Law.46 Law 489 prohibited the
extradition of Dominican nationals, thereby providing a safe refuge for Dominican
criminals who committed crimes in the United States and fled back to their homeland.47
International drug trafficking and anti-drug enforcement policies certainly impact extra-
dition practices between the Caribbean, South America, and the United States.
C. Non-extradition Policy and the Need for Irregular Rendition
This lack of cooperation and unwillingness to even consider extradition as a means
toward a just resolution has caused some states, particularly the United States, to con-
sider irregular rendition. Irregular rendition is typically considered to be the "abduction
of an individual from one nation by agents of another nation" or by relying on private
agents, such as bounty hunter and informants, to accomplish the same task.48 Rendition
38. See id. at 17.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 18.
41. See Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, Sept. 14, 1979, U.S.-Colom., S. Treaty Doc.
No.97-8.
42. See Bruce Zagaris, Protecting the Rule of Law from Assault in the War Against Drugs and Narco-
Terrorism, 15 NoVAL. REv. 703,707-08 (1991).
43. See Ley 27 de 1980 (Colom.).
44. See Igor. I. Kavass, Colombia: Supreme Court Decision on the Law Concerning the Extradition Treaty
Between Colombia and the United States, 27 I.L.M. 492, 496 (1988).
45. See Convention Between the United States and the Dominican Republic for the Extradition of
Criminals, June 19, 1909, U.S.-Dom. Rep., 36 Stat. 2468 [hereinafter Dominican Treaty].
46. See No. 489 Ley de Extradiccion Del 22 de Octubre de 1969 (Dom. Rep.).
47. See id. art. 4.
48. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1997).
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is also carried out through the "informal surrender of an individual by one nation to
another without formal or legal process," or through the "use of immigration laws to
expel an accused or convicted criminal from a country," or by luring a fugitive to U.S.
territory, international waters, or to other countries where their renditions can be more-
readily obtained. 4 9 For the purposes of this paper, the traditional irregular rendition
method consists of abductions of suspected terrorists from one nation by agents of an-
other nation without the nation's consent.
"Irregular rendition has deep historical roots."50 "In the United States, the history of
irregular rendition dates back further than extradition," with many early irregular rendi-
tions involving the border countries of Canada and Mexico.5' In 1866, the United States
exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over John Surratt, a possible co-conspirator in the
assassination of President Abraham Lincoln.52 Law enforcement officers returned Sur-
ratt to the United States after he had fled to Alexandria, Egypt.53 The U.S. Supreme
Court has consistently approved of the irregular method of rendition. The Ker-Frisbie
doctrine "states that forcible abductions as a method of arresting and returning fugitives
from a foreign land will not bar U.S. courts from asserting jurisdiction when the accused
finally appears before them. '54 Federal courts have relied on this doctrine in upholding
the legality of state-sponsored abductions in later decisions.55 "The courts almost
unanimously follow Ker-Frisbie."
56
Often, the United States chooses irregular rendition to apprehend a suspect who has
committed criminal acts against a U.S. citizen abroad. In Alvarez-Machain,57 Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was indicted for the kidnapping and
murder of U.S. DEA Special Agent Camarena-Salazar in Mexico. 58 Alvarez-Machain
was abducted by Mexican police officers who were acting at the request of the DEA and
was flown to the United States to be turned over to DEA agents. 9 The Mexican gov-
ernment did not wish to cooperate with the United States to bring Camarena's assailants
to justice. Additionally, high-level Mexican government officials were said to be linked
to the kidnapping. 60 This right to intervene and protect nationals abroad when the for-
eign state was unwilling or unable to do so has been recognized in past customary inter-
national law, international arbitral decisions, as well as in writings of jurists and in the
practice of states.61 "Traditional law has recognized the right of a state to [use force] for
the protection of the lives and property of its nationals abroad in situations where the
state of their residence ... is unable or unwilling to grant them the protection to which







54. Id. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. at 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. at 522 (1951).
55. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); United States ex. rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Calhoun v. Twomey, 454 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1971).
56. See Argiro Kosmetatos, Comment, U.S. -Mexican Extradition Policy: Were the Predictions Right about
Alvarez?, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1064, 1074 (1999) (footnote ommitted).
57. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
58. See id. at 657.
59. See id.
60. See Gurule, supra note 10, at 460.
61. See id. at 480.
62. Id. at 479, 480. (citing PHILIP C. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1949)).
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IV. Irregular Rendition May Be Justifiable in Rare Circumstances
It is important to remember that irregular rendition would not be necessary if the re-
quested state used "due diligence" to prosecute and punish criminal offenders when they
choose not to extradite.63 Because of these states who have been corrupted by terrorists,
drug traffickers, and narco-terrorists and have put no effort to prosecute, U.S. federal
law enforcement agents are faced with the difficult choice of either following the cus-
tomary extradition treaty and taking the chance that terrorists or drug traffickers will
avoid prosecution for their crimes, or bypassing traditional legal channels by obtaining
custody of fugitives through irregular rendition.
Also, the United States is not the only state that faces the difficult decision of
whether or not to choose irregular rendition. In February of 1999, Turkey abducted from
Nairobi, Abdullah Ocalan, the Kurdish fugitive whose rebel forces had waged a 15-year
separatist insurrection in Turkey.64 Ocalan was tricked into boarding an aircraft in Nai-
robi, believing he was headed for political asylum in the Netherlands.6 5 The Kurdish
leader will stand trial as a terrorist facing the death penalty. Kurds stormed the Greek
and Kenyan diplomatic missions and battled police in more than thirty cities.66 In March
of 1999, North Korea attempted to abduct from Thailand, Hong Sun Gyong, a former
commercial counselor at the North Korean Embassy in Bangkok, after accusing him of
embezzling millions of dollars his government had allocated to pay Thailand for rice.
67
Thailand's foreign minister delivered an official protest to the North Korean Embassy
over the attempt to abduct Gyong. Thailand has a law, called the International Coopera-
tion on Criminal Cases Act, which an affected country can resort to in the absence of an
extradition treaty with Thailand.68 Thus, according to Thailand, a country should not
need to take action by itself. This is regarded as an act of disrespect to Thailand's sover-
eignty and integrity.
69
A. The International Community Reaction to Irregular Rendition
The international community has its own ideas on irregular rendition. It has been
noted that international law has recognized a right to protect nationals abroad when the
foreign state was unwilling or unable to do so. Additionally, territorial sovereignty has
been recognized, and article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter restricts use of force extraterritori-
ally and states: "All members shall refrain ... from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. ,70 Article 2(4) may be construed as prohibiting
all uses of force extraterritorially. The exception to the restriction of use of force extra-
territorially is under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which says that a state is justified in
using force to repel "an armed attack. 7 1 Many scholars disagree as to whether the right
to protect nationals abroad survived the adoption of the U.N. Charter.72 If the term
"armed attack" is broadly construed, protecting nationals abroad would be considered an
act of self-defense against an informal "armed attack" by those causing harm to nation-
63. Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 82 (1925).
64. See Paul Koring, Kurds Enrages as Rebel Chief Snatched, GLOBE & MAIL, February 17, 1999, at Al.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Thongbai Thongpao, Commentary: Extradition Procedures Must Not Be Ignored, BANGKOK POST,
March 21, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8496140.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para 4.
71. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51.
72. See Gurul6, supra note 10, at 481.
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als abroad. If the term "armed attack" were to be construed narrowly, armed attack
would strictly mean a military attack made by one state on another's land, and would not
justify use of force extraterritorially to protect nationals abroad.
According to Professor Gurul6, three theories have emerged to either restrict or ap-
prove irregular rendition, according to the interpretation of the language in article 2(4)
and 51. The restrictive theory prohibits the use of force regardless of the intervening
state's motives and only makes a narrow exception in response to a foreign-armed at-
tack.73 The realist theorists argue that the literal reading of article 2(4) does not limit the
right of a state to use force to protect its nationals abroad.7 4 According to realist schol-
ars, "use of force to protect a state's nationals in a foreign territory is not directed at the
'territorial integrity' or 'political independence' of the foreign state."'75 Lastly, under the
self-defense theory, "the use of force. .. is viewed as an extension of the lawful exercise
of a state's right of self-defense. '76 One could argue that the defense of nationals is, in
effect, the defense of the state itself.77 Whatever the justification for irregular rendition
may be, the language in article 2(4) is not so specific that a state could not, in some way,
use the realist or self-defense theories to circumvent article 2(4) and carry out irregular
rendition in particular circumstances.
Besides what international law, according to the U.N. Charter, may suggest regard-
ing irregular rendition, irregular rendition also has an impact on other nations. Using the
Alvarez-Machain case as an example, after the Supreme Court ruling in Alvarez-
Machain in 1992, the Inter-American Judicial Committee of the OAS issued "an opinion
that characterized the abduction as a serious violation of public international law and
impermissible transgression of Mexico's territorial sovereignty."7 8 In November 1992,
Ibero-American Summit Conference participants formally requested the U.N. General
Assembly to submit to the International Court of Justice an advisory opinion regarding
the legality of international abductions.79 Canadian leaders questioned the status of the
U.S.-Canada extradition treaty and threatened criminal prosecution of individuals who
participated in any transborder abductions from Canadian soil.80 "Latin American gov-
ernments expressed their opposition by refusing to cooperate with U.S. extradition re-
quests., 81 The Mexican government temporarily suspended government cooperation
with DEA agents in Mexico, demanded a re-negotiation of the Treaty and vowed to
prosecute any individuals participating in law enforcement activities on Mexican soil
without prior authorization. 82 These types of protests over the irregular rendition of Al-
varez-Machain can not be said to be particularly uncommon whenever irregular rendi-
tion is used.
B. When Irregular Rendition May Be Appropriate
Due to the international consequences and protests that occur after irregular rendi-
tion takes place, it may be that states stop using irregular rendition as an instrument to
bring about justice and protect its nationals abroad. Professor Gurul6 provides a com-
73. See id. at 482.
74. See id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 484.
77. See id. at 485.
78. Legal Opinion of the Inter-American Judicial Committee on the Decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in
the Alvarez-Machain Case, reprinted in 13 HuM. RTS. L.J. 395 (1992).
79. See U.N. Doc. A/47/249 (1992).
80. See Shocking Ruling from U.S. Court, TORONTO STAR, June 17, 1992, at A20.
81. See Kosmetatos, supra note 56, at 1088 (footnote omitted).
82. See Tim Golden, Mexicans Mollified over Drug Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1992, at A3.
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pelling argument as to when irregular rendition may be appropriate. First, an abduction
should be used only in extreme cases and should be narrowly restricted and confined to
when an asylum state has refused to punish or extradite.83 When the asylum state
breaches its duty of "due diligence," it violates customary international law and there-
fore, becomes an accomplice in crime. 4 Second, an abduction should only occur in the
case of a violation of a serious and heinous crime.85 "When an individual is charged with
any of these offenses [e.g., terrorist bombings, murder, hijacking, kidnapping, and large-
scale narcotics trafficking], the foreign state's failure to act jeopardizes the safety of
American nationals by encouraging future terrorist acts or other violent crimes. ,86 Third,
the doctrine of proportionality suggests that a state should be sanctioned to only use "the
amount of force necessary to apprehend the foreign fugitive. '87 Lastly, irregular rendi-
tion should be approved by the Attorney General after consultation with other admini-
stration officials in order to ensure that "proper consideration would be given to foreign
policy concerns and would provide for a comprehensive risk-benefit assessment at the
highest levels of government., 88 Under these guidelines, irregular rendition could be
justified due to the amount of careful thought and consideration made by all levels of
government. The foreign state has already violated international law, and it is up to the
state who has examined the advantages and disadvantages in the particular situation to
decide whether it is in their best interest to proceed with the irregular rendition. A sys-
tem of checks and balances is appropriate when deciding to choose use of force extrater-
ritorially over another state's territorial sovereignty.
Having already established guidelines as to when irregular rendition may be neces-
sary in a particular situation, it must be recognized that there is no single, universal so-
lution to the problems that are brought about by serious and violent crimes such as acts
of terrorism, murder, hijacking, kidnapping, and large-scale narcotics trafficking, re-
gardless of where they are committed. This fact only reinforces the need for multiple
creative solutions, to resolve or at least control the growth of crimes such as terrorism.
In light of this, it is important to look at other options to irregular rendition, which may
prove more beneficial in the long-run and less controversial among nation states.
V. Other Options to Irregular Rendition
Irregular rendition is an extreme measure which may bring an international terrorist
to justice in the short term while creating a myriad of dire and unforeseen consequences
in the long run. For this reason, irregular rendition is used infrequently and with great
discretion by the U.S. However, there are several other forms of rendition which are less
offensive and equally as effective as irregular rendition. U.S. federal law enforcement
agencies have successfully lured fugitives abroad into international waters or other
countries from where their rendition can be more easily effected. In addition, U.S. law
enforcement in conjunction with the State Department have discretely persuaded many
countries on a case-by-case basis to bypass the formal extradition or legal process by
simply handing over a fugitive to U.S. authorities for transport to the U.S. to face trial.
Neither of these rendition options violates territorial sovereignty, and therefore, is less
intrusive and more effective than the traditional irregular rendition method.
83. See Guruld, supra note 10, at 490.
84. See id. at 491.
85. See id.
86. Id.




The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the primary federal law enforcement
agency in the United States responsible for investigating acts of terrorism and carrying
out renditions in foreign countries. The FBI organizes overseas investigations with the
U.S. Department of State and the host foreign government.89 "Investigating acts of ter-
rorism overseas includes interviewing victims, collecting forensic evidence, and appre-
hending terrorist fugitives." 90 The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act
of 1984 expanded the FBI's jurisdiction to include investigating acts of terrorism di-
rected against U.S. citizens or U.S. interests overseas. 9t The 1988 Hostage Taking Act
was created to criminalize acts including hijacking and hostage-taking committed out-
side the United States by non-United States citizens, and essentially, sanctioned the
abduction of suspected terrorists. 92 In 1989, the Office of Legal Counsel at the U.S.
Department of Justice concluded that the FBI has legal authority under domestic U.S.
law to arrest persons in other countries without the consent of those countries.93 The
U.S. government has in fact brought back many suspects without using the formal ex-
tradition process by using the authority that this legislation provides.
A. Luring into International Waters
The United States government has used "luring" as an alternative to extradition, and
has authorized law enforcement authorities to lure suspects out of their homeland even if
an extradition treaty exists with that nation.94 For example, the FBI captured suspected
terrorist Fawaz Yunis, a citizen of Lebanon, by luring him into international waters off
the coast of Cyprus and then forcefully returning him, via U.S. naval ships and aircraft,
to the United States on charges of hostage taking and aircraft piracy. 95 Yunis was lured
onto the boat with an enticing drug deal. Despite the coercive rendition, the federal dis-
trict court for the District of Columbia allowed his prosecution under the 1988 Hostage
Taking Act.9 6 Neither Lebanon nor Cyprus appeared to have objected to Yunis' rendition
in international waters.
Luring fugitives into international waters has been considered to violate interna-
tional customary law because the principles of this law state that "a nation's agents may
not seize an individual from another nation without obtaining consent from the other
nation's government. 9 7 However, although different methods of rendition are done out-
side the formal process of extradition, luring can be considered less offensive than the
typical irregular rendition because no territory's sovereignty has been violated. Yunis
was tricked onto the boat in international waters under the pretense of a drug deal. U.S.
agents did not enter Cyprus and abduct him; Yunis voluntarily chose to get on the boat,
albeit through trickery.
89. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Terrorism in the United States 17 (1995).
90. Id.
91. See Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-399, ' 1202(a), 100
Stat. 896.
92. See U.S. v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
93. See The Legality as a Matter of Domestic Law of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities that
Depart from International law: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of William Barr, U.S. Assistant Attorney
General) [hereinafter Barr Statement].
94. See JORDAN J. PAUST, M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 426 (Carolina
Academic Press 1996).
95. United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
96. See id. at 955.
97. Paust, supra note 94, at 435 (footnote omitted).
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Some argue that this type of abduction violates the human rights of the abducted
person. The abductee is unlawfully arrested and detained by a nation which has chosen
to circumvent the formal process of extradition. 98 This issue, whether an abduction un-
der these circumstances constitutes a violation of human rights, has been addressed un-
der the Toscanino exception." Toscanino, an Italian convicted for conspiracy to import
narcotics to the United States, alleged that U.S. agents kidnapped him from his home in
Uruguay, took him to Brazil, brutally tortured him and brought him to the United States
to face trial. 100 Toscanino claimed that the illegality of his arrest and rendition, along
with his torture and interrogation, negated the court's jurisdiction. The Second Circuit
concluded that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine's narrow conception of due process, which re-
quires a fair trial, should also include the manner in which the accused is brought to trial
or else this type of rendition would reward "police brutality" and "lawlessness."' 0'1
Subsequent court decisions further developed the Toscanino exception. For an ab-
duction to prejudice the outcome of a trial, the court ruled in ex rel Lujan v. Gengler 102
that a fugitive must establish first, that the governmental conduct in question "shocks the
conscience," second, that the abduction was the work of state agents, and third, there
was a protest by the injured state. 0 3 The Toscanino exception in general, therefore, can
be said to curb any conduct by U.S. law enforcement agents which would result in hu-
man rights violations of the abducted fugitive; otherwise, the abductee would go free.
The standard for a human rights violation in an abduction case was identified as any
action which would "shock the conscience" of the court. This exception allows for the
U.S. government to abduct suspected terrorists from international waters while still
safeguarding the human rights of the abductees. By this ruling, the courts affirmed the
jurisdiction and responsibility of law enforcement in overseas abduction cases, but sent
a clear message that gross human rights violations would not be tolerated.
The principal advantage of luring suspected terrorists into international waters
where they can be forcefully abducted and transported to the U.S. directly or via a coop-
erating third country is that this type of rendition eliminates any issue of violating a
state's sovereignty. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cunard S.S. Co.
v. Mellon'°4 held that the high seas are located where there is no territorial sover-
eignty.'0 5 U.S. maritime policy has always held that the "[a]ssurance that key sea and air
lines of communication will remain open as a matter of international legal right.'
0 6
Historically, the territorial jurisdiction of the United States extended for three miles
from the shore. 10 7 President Reagan issued a proclamation extending the territorial sea
of the United States to twelve miles from shore.10 8 Most countries now follow this
twelve-mile distinction. The twelve-mile limit includes the territorial sea, which extends
to three miles from the coast, and the contiguous zone, which extends from three to
twelve miles from the coast; the high seas lie seaward of the territorial sea.' 9 When U.S.
law enforcement agents forcefully abducted Fawaz Yunis, he was in international wa-
98. See id. at 436.
99. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir.
1974), on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916.
100. See id.
101. Id. at 272.
102. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1975).
103. See id. at 66-68.
104. 262 U.S. 100 (1923).
105. See id. at 123.
106. U.S. Dep't of Defense, National Security and Convention on the Law of the Sea 8 (1994).
107. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,441 (1989).
108. See Presidential Proclamation No. 5928, 3 C.F.R. 547 (1988).
109. See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063. 1073.
20001
Journal of Legislation
ters. As long as the U.S. vessel which was used in Yunis' abduction stayed beyond the
twelve-mile limit of the coast of Cyprus, U.S. agents were in a high seas area and could
not be said to be violating any local laws when luring Yunis onto their boat.
Futhermore, according to U.S. government officials in the Yunis case, extradition
treaties are designed to protect the territorial sovereignty of nation states and promote
global cooperation.' 1o The government contends that such sovereignty is threatened only
when a foreign power enters another country for the purposes of abducting one of its
residents. Since the United States never entered or invaded the sovereign territory of
Lebanon or Cyprus when arresting the defendant, there was no reason to make an extra-
dition request.
Whereas irregular rendition consists of unilateral action, no cooperation among
states, no consent, and a violation of territorial sovereignty, luring criminal suspects into
international waters is a different form of rendition since only one sovereign nation is
involved in this type of action. Luring may not be the most efficient method to bring a
suspect back to the requested state, but it does eliminate the potential offense of violat-
ing territorial sovereignty.
B. Informal Cooperative Efforts between States
States have sought to overcome the limitations placed on international law enforce-
ment activities arising from the principle of territorial sovereignty by engaging in a dis-
crete process of informal cooperation in matters dealing with extraterritorial crime and
in apprehending fugitives. "1 When such cooperation is possible, no question of unilat-
eral action even arises." 2 When one state allows the removal of a fugitive in its territory
by agents of another state without legal process and outside the parameters of a formal-
ized extradition treaty, then this is essentially a cooperative expulsion or deportation.
This cooperative expulsion is an informal process that proves to be less offensive than
irregular rendition and promotes cooperation and consensual, bilateral action on the part
of all states involved. This method appears to be most effective in accomplishing its
objectives while invoking no or little international opprobrium or state sponsored re-
taliation later on since both states were involved in the operation.
For example, on February 7, 1995, FBI agents and State Department diplomatic se-
curity officers apprehended fugitive Ramzi Ahmed Yousef in Islamabad, Pakistan.
113
Pakistani officials turned Yousef over to U.S. agents and he was transported to the
United States the following day where he was arraigned on charges relating to his al-
leged involvement in the February 26, 1993, World Trade Center bombing.' 14 In April
of 1995, Yousef was indicted for conspiring to bomb Philippine Airlines Flight 434 and
several other carriers transiting the Far East." 5 This is an example of Pakistani and U.S.
officials working discretely together to capture a suspected terrorist. Normal extradition
procedures would not have been possible because Pakistan did not want to call attention
to the fact that they were contributing to Yousefs rendition and transportation to the
United States.
Due to unstable political conditions and the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, some
countries in the Middle East do not want to be viewed as a U.S. partner in bringing ter-
rorists to justice. These countries can ill afford the publicity and attention that a formal
110. See Yunis, 859 F.2d at 953.
111. See Barr Statement, supra note 92.
112. See id.





extradition process might create. However, many governments are willing to provide
informal cooperation which is usually not made public and, therefore, conducted with-
out the knowledge of any citizen group which might protest or oppose such actions. This
type of cooperation usually results in either the informal surrender of a fugitive to U.S.
authorities, or allowing U.S. agents to forcefully abduct a fugitive within its territory
without interference, participation or protest.
The FBI is the lead agency which investigates acts of terrorism directed at Ameri-
cans overseas. With the passage of new laws expanding the FBI's extraterritorial juris-
diction to combat international terrorism,"16 the FBI has become more and more in-
volved in overseas investigations of terrorist acts and threats. And after a presidential
directive in May, 1999, the FBI has worked more intimately with intelligence agencies
and the military in foreign counterintelligence operations targeting international terror-
ists.117
On the day of the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on August 7,
1998, suspected terrorist Mohammed Saddiq Odeh passed through a Pakistani airport
and was arrested by local authorities for carrying a false passport."18 After nearly a week
of interrogation by Pakistani investigators, Odeh admitted that he had helped organize
the Kenya bombing, gave key details of the plot, and confirmed that Osama bin Laden
had directed and financed the bombings from his base in Afghanistan." l9 This informa-
tion led directly to several other arrests and the seizure of significant evidence in several
countries.
The Pakistani government, which had never officially advised the U.S. government
of Odeh's capture and interrogation, quietly deported him with U.S. assistance to
Kenya. 120 It was in Nairobi that Kenyan authorities allowed FBI criminal investigators
to interview Odeh. 121 Once in the custody of U.S. officials, Odeh was granted his due
process and constitutional guarantees since only information gained under procedures
acceptable in a U.S. court can make its way into the indictments naming him, bin Laden
and 14 others for their alleged roles in the embassy bombings.
22
Some have criticized the FBI for allowing Pakistani interrogators to use tactics that
might not necessarily be permitted under the laws of the U.S. However, the U.S. has no
jurisdiction over Pakistani police interrogators or their interview techniques; regardless
of the legality or potential abuses of due process when Odeh provided his confession,
any statements made by Odeh to Pakistani investigators would be inadmissible in U.S.
courts. Due to the disparity among nations in both due process and the treatment of pris-
oners, it has been suggested that international human rights laws should regulate state-
sponsored interrogations and abductions rather than allow each state to follow its own
domestic policy.123 In this instance, due to the cooperative efforts of Pakistani, Kenyan,
116. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, '2002(a), 98 Stat. 2186. See also
The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, supra note 91.
117. See Robert Suro, FBI's "Clean" Team Follows "Dirty" Work of Intelligence; Units Pool Facts on






123. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights only states that everyone has 'the right to life, liberty,
and security of person" and that "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest." G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948), Article 3 & 9. The words "security of person" and "arbitrary arrest" have been
interpreted to include kidnaping. See Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned
Abductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 12 (1997). "As a general
rule, the prohibition of abduction has a legitimate rationale. Individuals should have the right to walk down the
street without the fear of a foreign government kidnapping them for unknown reasons. However, under
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and U.S. officials, bin Laden and other terrorists have been indicted in U.S. courts and
will eventually be brought to justice.
Another example of cooperative rendition occurred in the Philippines. On April 22,
1995, Philippine authorities transferred Abdul Hakim Murad to FBI agents. 124 Philippine
police found and arrested Murad after a fire broke out in a Manila apartment in which
Murad, Ramzi Yousef, and another person were living.125 Inside the apartment, Philip-
pine officials noticed explosives and bomb making materials. Murad was then returned
to the United States, and along with Ramzi Yousef, was charged with conspiring to
bomb U.S. civil aircraft transiting the Far East. 126 Jordanian officials have also cooper-
ated with U.S. authorities in the apprehension of suspected terrorists. On August 2,
1995, Jordanian authorities rendered Eyad Ismoil Najim, a Palestinian, to FBI cus-
tody. 27 Najim was charged with bombing and conspiracy violations in connection with
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
28
One of the more famous cooperative expulsion cases was Matta-Ballesteros v.
Henman.12 9 U.S. Marshals, assisted by Honduran paramilitary troops, abducted a Hon-
duran fugitive involved in drug trafficking from Honduras and brought him to the
United States for trial. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the fugitive's appeal that his abduc-
tion from Honduras by U.S. agents violated the extradition treaty between Honduras and
the United States; in addition, the court ruled against the fugitive who further claimed
that the circumstances of his abduction and the treatment to which he had been subjected
were sufficiently egregious that the court was divested of jurisdiction over him.130 The
court noted that the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain had been careful to state that an
extradition treaty would only be violated if forcible abduction was specifically prohib-
ited by the express terms of the treaty.' 3 1 There were no such express terms in the Hon-
duras-U.S. Extradition Treaty, and thus, no violation of the extradition treaty. 1
32
Also, the court held it could exercise its "inherent supervisory powers" to order dis-
missal for only three reasons: "(1) to implement a remedy for the violation of a recog-
nized statutory or constitutional right; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring a
conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; (3) and to deter
future illegal conduct."' 33 The circumstances surrounding Matta-Ballesteros' abduction,
while "disturbing," did not meet these criteria. 34 In light of Alvarez-Machain, the pur-
ported actions of the U.S. marshals had "violated no recognized constitutional or statu-
tory rights." 135 The only circumstances in which the court could exercise its supervisory
powers would be where the fugitive could demonstrate governmental misconduct "of the
most shocking and outrageous kind," and the fugitive had not done so by saying he had
circumstances where crimes are horrendous enough to shock the international conscience, states must be able
to balance the potential for human rights violations by abduction with the numerous human rights violations
committed by notorious evildoers [like Osama bin Laden and infamous terrorists and narco-terrorists]. It is at
this point, where the individual's violations far outweigh the violation of the abduction, that the abduction
should be permissible and should not be considered a violation of human rights." Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
124. See TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit,
U.S. Department of Justice 1995).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 8.
128. See id.
129. 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 878 (1990).
130. See United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 762-63 (9th Cir. 1995).
131. See id. at 762.
132. See id.
133. Id. at 763 (citing United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1991).
134. See id. at 763.
135. Id. at 763-64.
[Vol. 26:315
Kidnapped Terrorists
been immobilized by the use of stun guns.' 3 6 Since there was no ground for the exercise
of the court's supervisory powers, the court rejected the fugitive's jurisdictional objec-
tions and proceeded to affirm the district court's decision on substantive grounds. 137 The
court's use of "shocking and outrageous" in language to describe possible misconduct on
the part of U.S. officials, which if true would have benefited the defendant and provided
cause to dismiss the case, sounded similar to the Toscanino due process exception al-
ready in place. A similar standard exists for U.S. domestic cases wherein the abuse of
police authority or the flagrant violation of a suspect's rights by law enforcement agents
will usually result in the dismissal of criminal charges pending against the defendant.
Since domestic, both state and federal, and international due process procedures are
essentially identical, it is not surprising that U.S. courts have demonstrated an unwill-
ingness to validate the customary defense tactic utilized by most abducted fugitives
when they claim that irregular rendition is both illegal and a violation of their human
rights. On the contrary, criminal cases such as Matta-Ballesteros have demonstrated that
cooperative expulsion is a valuable law enforcement tool which can be successful as
long as a fugitive's human rights are not violated.
Most nations will offer to surrender fugitives to the United States out of comity, or
choose to expel them for inadequate visas. 138 These forms of rendition prove to be faster
and less expensive than the full extradition procedure.1 39 The only states that have been
unwilling to cooperate in apprehending suspected terrorists are recognized state spon-
sors of international terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Cuba, and North Ko-
rea. 140 Diplomats from some of these countries have been involved in terrorist-related
activities. 141 They would not cooperate either through extradition or the less formal pro-
cess of rendition. However, most other states are willing to expel suspected terrorists
from their borders; since this cooperation is both voluntary and conducted by mutual
consent between the governments of the countries involved in this action, cooperative
expulsions are viewed, as both legal and appropriate by U.S. courts. And if the interna-
tional community continues to harbor concerns that these forceful abductions violate a
fugitive's human rights, an international law-making body like the U.N. should legiti-
mize and regulate these abductions under certain conditions.
142
Hence, the international customary rule against forcible abductions is inapplicable to
cooperative expulsions because there is active cooperation in the abduction by the in-
jured or host state, and therefore, no possible protest by the injured state. These coop-
erative expulsions are effective methods of bringing a suspected terrorist back to a re-
questing state, especially when no extradition treaty exists between the two states in-
volved.
C. Improving Foreign Relations while Improving the Extradition Process
There is no doubt that a positive effort to improve foreign relations between the U.S.
and those countries which do not recognize uniform extradition procedures would help
to limit future disagreements on both the need and justification for irregular rendition.
136. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 764 (citing United States v. Valot, 625 F.2d 308, 310 (9th Cir. 1980)).
137. See id. at 772.
138. See Richard Downing, The Domestic and International Implications of the Abduction of Criminals
from Foreign Soil, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 573, 577 (1990).
139. See id.
140. See Terrorism in the United States 12 (Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, U.S.
Department of Justice 1995).
141. See id.
142. See Beverly Izes, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Abductions of War Criminals
Should be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1 (1997).
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Diplomacy, cooperation, and mutually acceptable solutions to extradition issues will
always be preferable to any unilateral action, such as the forceful abduction of fugitives
by one state from the territory of another state.
1. Mexico
For example, after the Alvarez-Machain case, the Bush administration promised to
refrain from future overseas abductions and promoted a policy of international coopera-
tion. 14 3 With the signing of NAFTA in 1993, bilateral negotiations between U.S. and
Mexican leaders resulted in the signing of the Transborder Abduction Treaty in 1994.144
In return for an end to state-sponsored abductions, the U.S. government asked that
Mexican officials consider extraditing their citizens to the United States upon request.
1 4
1
Previously, Article 9 of the United States-Mexican Extradition Treaty did not require
either state to extradite its own citizens. 146 Unfortunately, the Transborder Abduction
Treaty failed to specifically address the option to extradite under the Treaty, hence it
gave Mexico no incentive to extradite its own nationals. 147 However, the signing of the
Transborder Abduction Treaty does signify a renewed effort by both governments to-
wards improvement of extradition policies. Possibly in the future, with greater trust and
respect built between the two countries, the United States could renegotiate the Treaty to
require extradition where all of the applicable grounds and procedures under the agree-
ment apply in the particular circumstance.
Also, in order to adopt a more aggressive policy against drug trafficking and politi-
cal corruption in Mexico, the U.S. President, according to Section 490(b) of the Foreign
Assistance Act, must certify that Mexico has cooperated with the U.S. government or
has taken adequate steps on its own to combat drug trafficking. 48 After President
Clinton's decision to grant recertification to Mexico, the U.S. State Department claimed
that Mexico's 1996 counter-drug measures yielded encouraging results and lauded the
notable progress in bilateral cooperation.
49
Lastly, Mexico's policy on extradition has originated, in large part, from Article IV
of the Mexican Constitution, which prevents the Mexican government from extraditing
its own nationals.' 50 Mexico's extradition policy seems to be slowly changing. The
Mexican government expelled a Mexican citizen, Juan Chapa Garcia, to the United
States in 1995 on charges of drug trafficking.' 5 1 And in April 26, 1996, Mexican Presi-
dent Zedillo broke precedent and authorized the extradition of two Mexican nationals to
the United States, invoking the "exceptional circumstances" provision in Mexico's Inter-
national Extradition Law to justify the extradition of its own nationals. 152 Mexican
authorities agreed to extradite six more suspects in 1997, including several for drug-
143. See Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on the Supreme Court Decision on the Alvarez-
Machain Case, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1063 (June 15, 1992).
144. See 139 CONG. REC. H6964 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993)(statement of Rep. Brown);139 Cong. Rec.
H6965 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993)(statement of Rep. Fields). Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, Nov.
23, 1994, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 (The Transborder Abduction Treaty has not been submitted to the U.S.
Senate for Advice and Consent to Ratification.) [hereinafter Transborder Abduction Treaty].
145. See id.
146. See Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States, May 4,
1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter Treaty].
147. See Kosmetatos, supra note 56, at 1104.
148. See Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C. ' 2291 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
149. See 143 CONG. REC. S2581 (daily ed. March 20, 1997) (statement of Sen. Coverdell).
150. See Kosmetatos, supra note 56, at 1101.




related offenses.153 These extraditions seem to be small steps in the right direction and
are evidence of a trend towards greater cooperation between both governments. The
aftermath of Alvarez-Machain seems to have caused the United States to become more
sensitive to relations between states, and particularly in Mexico, led to the signing of the
Transborder Abduction Treaty, the ratification of NAFTA, the Clinton Administration's
decision to re-certify Mexico for state aid in the fight against narcotics trafficking, and
the Mexican government's willingness to extradite its nationals under an exceptional
circumstances clause.
2. Colombia
In the case of Colombia, both improved relations and cooperation with the United
States and domestic changes within Colombia led to the creation of a pro-extradition
policy in Colombia. In the past, narco-terrorism definitely hindered any attempts to cre-
ate extradition reform; Colombians generally viewed extradition as a violation of their
sovereign authority.154 But, after a serious crackdown on cartel leaders in the mid-to-late
1990s, the Colombian political and judicial systems gained renewed strength. 155 "New
reform-minded politicians and jurists recognized that extradition might help solve Co-
lombia's drug cartel problem.''156 By the late 1990s, many Colombian lawmakers rein-
terpreted extradition as a tool and not a renunciation of national sovereignty.' 57 These
reformers also recognized the global trend towards multilateralism in enforcing anti-
drug policies. 58 In 1997, Colombia passed its new extradition law, which provides for
the extradition of Colombian nationals, although Columbia still retains the principle of
discretion. 59 Unfortunately, the new extradition law does not apply retroactively, and
many feel this provision reflects months of drug cartel lobbying, bribery, and death
threats on Colombian lawmakers.' 60 Nevertheless, Colombia's president Samper praised
the new'law as a crucial step in the fight against drug cartels. 16 At least the new law is
one step in the right direction towards promoting bilateral cooperation, even if many
Colombian drug traffickers already wanted on charges in the United States are exempt
from the new law.
3. The Dominican Republic
Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, Dominican lawmakers began to understand
that modem anti-drug enforcement required a reconceptualization of sovereignty that
would accommodate the extradition of nationals.' 62 Meanwhile, the Dominican Repub-
lic's new president, President Fernandez, felt he could utilize extradition as a platform
for garnering political power and could remove drug dealers who supported his political
opponents. 63 Acknowledging that the threat posed by organized drug trafficking sur-
passed traditional notions of sovereignty, the Dominican Congress passed a law that
would provide for extradition of nationals, specifically targeting drug-trafficking and
drug-related offenses.' 64 And, although the law also provides a great deal of discretion
153. See id.
154. See Warmund, supra note 15, at 2404.
155. See id. at 2406-07.
156. Id at 2407.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See Acto Legislativo Numero 01 de 1997 (Colombia).
160. See Warmund, supra note 15, at 2420.
161. See id. at 2421-22.
162. See id. at 2416.
163. See id& n. 295.
164. See Ley 278-98 del 29 de Julio de 1998 (Dominican Republic).
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to the President over particular extradition decisions, again, as in Colombia and Mexico,
it is a step in the right direction towards promoting bilateral cooperation in the fight
against narco-terrorism.
4. European States
Not to be outdone by the pro-extradition movements in Latin America and the Car-
ibbean, Europe, which, in the past, has been criticized as being soft on international
terrorism compared to the United States' "no blackmail, no concessions" policy, is now
moving towards multilateral cooperation and implementing joint counterterrorism ini-
tiatives. 165 The progress in consolidating the European Union may be a major factor in
encouraging governments to take steps to abandon the rule of non-extradition of nation-
als, open its borders, and provide mutual legal assistance. The 1992 Treaty on European
Union, the Maastricht Treaty, promoted legal cooperation by mandating the creation of a
European Police Office (Europol) to facilitate cooperation between the national police
forces of the European Union member states and also by providing a joint information-
sharing system that covers a variety of crimes, such as illicit drug trafficking, money
laundering, and terrorism.'
66
This idea of cooperation seems to be working. In 1999, the same France that in 1977
refused a request for extradition for a PLO terrorist, arrested six leading members of the
Basque separatist group, ETA, as well as, convicted six Libyans for the 1989 in-flight
bombing of a French jetliner over Africa. 167 And in 1998, during the World Cup Soccer
Games, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland coordinated simultaneous
police raids which led to the arrest of over 100 terrorists.168 This operation claimed to
have smashed three important terrorist logistical support networks.'
69
These efforts of bilateral and multilateral cooperation among states reveal signs of
significant improved relations in recent years among states. With improved relations can
come discussions regarding the possible extradition of criminal suspects with states who
previously had a strict non-extradition policy. If states keep working together and gain
trust and mutual respect, irregular rendition will no longer have to be used as a tool to
bring an offender into a country who wishes to prosecute him. Hence, both ideas of
territorial sovereignty and protecting one's nationals abroad from acts of violence and
terrorism will receive the same amount of respect. Increased cooperation among states is
a better, more just resolution than irregular rendition.
D. Overturning the Rule of Non-Extradition of Nationals
Along the lines of improved cooperation among states, states must also emphasize
reciprocity with each other, especially to those nations that lean toward non-extradition
of their nationals. Back in ancient times, when there was a great amount of hostility
between nations and tribes and disparities in the level of civilization, the surrender of a
subject to a foreign state was practically exile, if not death.
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But today, in this age of civilization, this ancient practice of non-extradition is no
longer necessary or justified. While the arguments associated with extradition include
"world legal order, fundamental justice, and the need to strengthen the international
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solidarity and spirit of cooperation in the suppression of criminality, the counter-
arguments point almost exclusively to the domestic matters of a state."' 7 1 Those who
oppose the extradition of their nationals should be asked to reevaluate their justification,
reexamine its validity, and reconsider their further adherence to this rule.
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There are many reasons why non-extradition of nationals does not bring about the
most just outcome. Oftentimes, authorities of the requested state face insurmountable
difficulties in conducting a criminal prosecution and trial; these difficulties are mainly
due to evidentiary considerations. 173 The evidence is usually found in the territory where
the offense occurred, not where the offender is from. Also, the state where the offense
was committed usually has the primary interest in seeing the offender brought to justice,
since they were the ones who were hardest hit by the offender's actions. Hence, it is
more desirable to base the decision of whether to prosecute in the requested country or
surrender the offender on mutual consultations between the appropriate authorities of
the states involved. A general and rigid rule of refusing to extradite nationals would
reduce the effectiveness of extradition to combat transnational crime.
Another option that is one that would allow the sentenced person to serve imprison-
ment in his home country, rather than be extradited to the country that imposed the sen-
tence.174 This would require both states to cooperate, and the requesting state would
have to be willing to entrust the enforcement of a sentence imposed by its court with the
authorities of the requested state. At the same time, the requested state has a duty to
respect and enforce a judgment rendered by a foreign court. These basic ideas have been
adopted in the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances of 1998 and the Inter-American Convention on Extradition of 1981.
It will be interesting to see if the creation of the European Union will eliminate the
rule of non-extradition among European states. Heading toward a step in the right direc-
tion, the participants in the 1989 International Conference on Extradition in Siracusa,
Italy challenged and criticized the rule of non-extradition as being incompatible with the
fundamental premises of justice and extradition. 176 The most recent proposal was
adopted in 1997 by the U.N. Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice,
and it was agreed that in the long term, states should work towards the elimination of the
ground for refusal based on the nationality of the requested person.
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E. United Nations Security Council Resolutions in Support of Extradition
In addition to the existing conventions which already support extradition, in 1992,
the United Nations Security Council adopted two resolutions regarding a state which
refused to cooperate with other states to apprehend criminal suspects and submit all
evidence gathered. 78 Libya refused to extradite two of its nationals who had been ac-
cused of planting the bomb which caused the mid-air explosion of Pan Am Flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, and was determined not to submit all the evidence gathered
after an extensive three-year investigation. With Resolution 748, the Security Council
171. Id. at 86.
172. See id. at 79.
173. See id. at 123.
174. See id. at 138.
175. See U.N. E/CONF. Doc. 82/15, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); See OEA/Ser. A/36, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 723 (1981).
176. See Plachta, supra note 24, at 92.
177. See U.N. Doc. E/CN.15/1997/L/16/Rev.1, at 6.
178. See Joint Declaration of the United States and the United Kingdom, U.N. Doc. S/23308 (1991),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 723 (1992).
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urged Libya to respond fully to the lawful requests of the United States, United King-
dom, and France, and also imposed economic sanctions on Libya.
179
When Libya brought the case before the International Court of Justice seeking
measures to prevent the United States or United Kingdom from compelling Libya to
hand over the two criminal suspects, the Court confirmed the validity and binding force
of Resolution 748.180 A possible interpretation of the Security Council's involvement in
Lockerbie could be that the Security Council is not only upholding the existing extradi-
tion system, but also supplementing the system with the recourse to intervene in excep-
tional situations, especially where the traditional treaty model proves unworkable.
The Court's approval of Resolution 748 takes precedence over any other interna-
tional agreement, and in essence, makes the choice between extradition and prosecution
and chooses extradition. This increased cooperation among the member states of the
U.N. to come to the just resolution of extradition to bring those criminal offenders to
justice demonstrates the world's commitment to see extradition become even more
common. The Security Council's resolutions on extradition and similar rulings by the
International Court of Justice will allow those countries who before had strict policies
against the extradition of nationals, to support the idea of extradition of all persons.
F. Stricter Extradition Treaties
While trying to convince those countries who refuse to extradite to adopt a less strict
policy of non-extradition, states must also revise existing extradition treaties to reflect
increased cooperation among the states. States should require extradition when all of the
applicable grounds and procedures under the agreement apply in the particular circum-
stance. The treaty must be tight enough to ensure prosecutors that they can recover
criminals who flee, or at least that the laws of either state will be followed. And, states
must not forget to contemplate good faith and mutual cooperation in the exchange of
criminal offenders.
A formula that has been employed to accommodate conflicting laws and policies
under extradition is the "optional clause," which the Foreign Office explains that "nei-
ther of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens or subjects
under the stipulations of this convention. '181 An optional clause does not express a deci-
sion to surrender, but rather provides discretion not to surrender.
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Such a formula has been included in several extradition treaties in recent years, such
as in Great Britain and Canada.18 3 The Mexican Supreme Court interpreted the optional
clause as not prohibiting, but authorizing, the parties to surrender their own citizens
according to their discretion. 184 Chief Justice Vallarta pointed out that if it had been the
intention of the signatory states to prohibit their authorities from surrendering their own
citizens, then they would have employed a clearer meaning, expressly stating that the
citizens of either state are exempted from the obligation to extradite. 185 This optional
clause allows those states which are not comfortable with extradition of its nationals, but
179. See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23574 (1992), reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 731 (1992); S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992).
180. See Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom, 1992 I.C.J. 3 at 90-91.
181. Plachta, supra note 24, at 143.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 143-44.
185. See id. at 144.
[Vol. 26:315
Kidnapped Terrorists
agree in principal on the need for extradition under certain circumstances, to be more
flexible by showing a willingness to surrender a subject to a foreign power while still
maintaining the discretion to refuse extradition.
VI. Conclusion
The need for irregular rendition is simply not as necessary as it was in the 1980s and
early 1990s. The examples of Mexico, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Europe
show that states are increasingly working together to solve the problems of international
crime, especially those as troubling and as prevalent as terrorism and narco-terrorism.
Nations must cooperate in international investigations to tackle terrorist acts.
The focus should be on identifying, apprehending, and presenting for the prosecu-
tion the criminal offender, and less importantly, where the offender will be prosecuted.
Luring suspected terrorists into international waters and apprehending fugitives through
cooperative efforts among states are viable and less offensive options than the traditional
irregular rendition method of forcibly abducting a criminal offender from one nation by
agents of another nation.
Besides other proposals such as greater cooperation, improved overall relations,
resolutions passed by the U.N. Security Council, and revising current extradition trea-
ties, it is also important to note that any change must come from within the country
which has refused extradition in the past. In Colombia and the Dominican Republic, the
changes in their extradition policies started with the general public and the legislative
bodies, who were tired of the hold the narco-terrorists have had over the entire country.
Countries, such as the United States, need to encourage states with non-extradition poli-
cies to reevaluate themselves, while simultaneously providing them with the respect and
trust these countries need to take their own judicial, legislative, or executive issues into
their own hands. This type of approach will prove to be more effective than irregular
rendition, although the need for irregular rendition in rare circumstances will most likely
survive. Luring, cooperative expulsion, and other approaches mentioned are all needed
to fight international terrorism.
Melanie M. Laflin
* Candidate, Juris Doctorate, Notre Dame Law School, 2001; M.S. (Spanish), Middleton College;
B.A., University of Notre Dame. I would like to dedicate this Note to my parents and Scott.
2000]

